The bidding process in public procurement in Sweden is a first-price, sealed bid auction.
Introduction
This paper studies Swedish municipalities' choice of allocation mechanism when auctioning a fixed price cleaning service contract, and the factors determining this choice. Auction theory is used to formalize the bidding process and analyze the multiple choice of allocation mechanisms given in the law. Bec ause of the large amount of money involved in public procurement in Sweden 1 and the increasing number of public goods and services procured by auctions, it is important to learn more about, and analyze th e economic implications of, th e policies and regulations governing these procurements.
Public procurement in Sweden is regulated by the Public Procurement Act (LOU(1992 (LOU( :1528 ), which in accordance with directives from the European Union (EU) promotes competitive bidding for public contracts. There are five different allocation mechanisms available to the contracting entity (which represents the municipality), in which sealed bids are stipulated. 2 The lowest bidder is awarded the contract, and is paid in accordance with his/her bid. The procurements a re thereby best approximated by the firstprice, sealed bid auction. The main difference between pure auction theory and practice is that the contracting entity can, through t he choice of allocation mechanism, limit the number of bidders allowed to participate in the auction. This multiple choice set of mechanisms is interesting. Because there is a competitive effect on the bids in the first-price, sealed bid auction, 3 the lowest bidder is the on e who offers to complete the contract at th e lowest cost.
The auction is efficient and therefore auction theory does not support restrictions on competition. 4 The main issue in this paper, is why there is a difference between practice and theory, in other words, why does the contracting entity use the option to restrict the competition instead of just using the plain first-price, sealed bid auction? This paper aims to empirically study both the possible determinants of this choice and the number of bidders for each contract.
The idea behind this study is to investigate whether the option to restrict the number of bidders may be motivated by a n implementation cost, f or the contracting entity. When th e 1 According to the Swedish Competition Authority (1996), public procurement in Sweden accounts for about 10 percent of the gross national product every year.
There is one exception, the direct procedure, which does not involve any bidding process and is not an auction. 3 The bid is monotonically decreasing in the number of bidders in the auction, given that the costs are assumed to be private. See next section.
contracting entity makes its choice, th e total cost of the procurement is minimized, which includes the implementation cost as well a s the expected payment to the winning bidder.
There is a trade off between a low implementation cos t and th e competitive effect on the payment to the contracted supplier. Further, the paper discusses whether municipalities may differ in their preferences with regard to the type of allocation mechanism used. One can argue that a more densely populated municipality will be more inclined to choose a restrictive mechanism, as more bidders can be expected. This will give rise to higher implementation costs, compared with less densely populated municipalities.
Auction theory was first formalized in Vic krey's seminal papers (1961, 1962) . There are an extensive number of articles on auctions and contracting, most of them are theoretical. One example is, McAfee and McMillan (1986) , who analyze government contracting within a model that combines auction and principal-agent th eory. They study three types of contracts, fixed price, incentive and cost plus, and derive the optimal contract. 5 Tan (1996) shows that the optimal allocation mechanism, when the contracting entity has private information about its demand, is the first-price, sealed bid auction. This is the mechanism that is most frequently used in practice. In a paper from 1992, Tan models the bids in the procurement as dependent on the supplier's investment level in research and development (R&D), and compares th e outcome from the first-price and second-price, sealed bid auctions 6 Higher levels of investment in R&D affect the decision to enter the auction and rise the probability of winning the contract. The role of R&D and information on procurement are further analyzed in Piccione and Tan (1996) . Hallwood (1996) studies a procurement auction with invited tenders. Contracts designed in order to achieve the best effort from providers and discrimination between foreign and domestic providers, are studied in Vagstad (1995) and Naegelen and Mougeot (1998) .
Two extensive surveys of empirical work concerning auctions are presented in Hendricks and Paarsch (1995) and Laffont (1997) . Hendricks, Po rter and Boudreau (1987) and Hendricks 4 See Laffont (1997). 5 The fixed-price contract stipulates a fixed payment, equa l to the bid, to the supplier regardless of what the cost to cany out the contract turns out to be. Under an incentive contract, the payment to the supplier is dependent on both the realized cost and the bid. The supplier and th e contracting entity share the responsibility for the cost over or under-run. The cost plus contract stipulates that the contracting entity agrees to cover all the costs realized by the supplier and either a fixed fee or a f ee that is proportional to the realized costs. See McAfee and McMillan (1986). 6 In the second-price sealed bid auction, the lowest bidder wins the contract but is paid in accordance with the second lowest bid. See McAfee and McMillan (1986) for a presentation of different auction mechanisms.
and Porter (1988, 1992, and 1993) use data from government auctions of off-shore oil and gas drainage leases in the USA. They focus on asymmetric information among bidders and joint bidding. In a paper by Vistnes (1994) , data from Medicaid's procurements of health services in California, are used to test hypotheses regarding optimal contracts when the information about costs is asymmetric. I n this case, t he optimal contract is proved to have a fixed price region. McAfee and McMillan (1996) analyze government auctions of airwaves in the US. This is a good example of the practical use of auction theory in public procurement. Bergman and Lundberg (1998) and Lundberg (2000) study asymmetric information among bidders and price formation, respectively, in historical public procurement of child care in Sweden. An empirical discussion of public procurement within t he EU can be found in Mardas (1999) . Lunander (1999a, 1999b) u se Swedish data 7 to estimate the parameters in the equilibrium bid function, in a first-price, sealed bid auction. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2000) exhibit a repeated procurement auction and apply data from the California Department of Transportation. The present paper contributes to the previous literature by analyzing the economic justification of the choice of allocation mechanism from an auction perspective, using field data.
The probability of observing a particular choice of allocation mechanism is estimated using data from Swedish municipalities' procurement of cleaning services during the period 1992 -1998. The contracting entity's choice of allocation mechanism is related to the volume of the procurement. If this exceeds a specific threshold value, the contracting entity can, through its choice of allocation mechanism, restrict the number of bidders in the auction. The contracting entity is assumed to make such a choice if this maximizes it's random utility. The determinants of the probability that the procurement is below t he threshold value and the probability that the contracting entity makes a competitive restrictive choice o f mechanism are estimated in two separate binary logit models. Contract specifications and municipality characteristics are used as explanatory variables. The variables in the regression equations are assumed to affect the implementation cost of the procurement, which the contracting entity seeks to minimize. Finally, negative binomial regression is used to estimate the determinants of the number of bidders for each contract.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The first-price, sealed bid auction is presented in Section 2. A guide to the five empirically available allocation mechanisms is given in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the contracting entity's choice of allocation mechanism and the cost minimizing problem. The empirical study and data are described in Section 5, followed by a presentation of the estimation results in Section 6. A summary and conclusions are given in Section 7.
The First-price Sealed Bid Auction
This section describes the first-price, sealed bid auction, which is used in public competitive procurement in Sweden, and other EU countries. Assume that n commonly known potential suppliers compete for a fixed price cleaning service contract offered by a contracting entity.
The winner of the contract is the lowest bidding supplier, who is paid in accordance with his/her bid. The winner agrees to carry out the contract at the price stipulated in the contract.
The potential suppliers are assumed to be risk neutral. A further assumption is that each potential supplier privately knows his/her own cost (c) to carry out the contract, but not the other potential suppliers' costs. The costs are determined before the bidding starts and independently drawn from a symmetric probability distribution, known to all the potential suppliers, with cumulative distribution F(c), and probability density function f(c), in accordance with the private values model. 8 The intuitive reasons behind this choice of model are that the suppliers are likely to know their own costs but not those of their competitors with certainty. Variations in cost s can be explained by differences in the production functions of the suppliers. Cleaning service contracts do not offer any resale opportunities and have no o r low elements of uncertainty regarding the cost for completing the contract. The auction is modeled as a Nash non-cooperative game. The derivation of the equilibrium bid function follows the one given in Donald and Paarsch (1993) .
Consider the problem o f bidder z. Assume that his/her n-1 competitors also are using a common bidding rule ß(c), which is assumed to be increasing and differentiable in c. Bidder z chooses a bid bt (when the true cost for the cleaning service is c. ) that will maximize his/her expected profit
(1)
where (Z >, -c, ) is the profit if he/she wins the contract and [l-i 7^-1^) )]" 1 is the probability that the competing bidders make higher bids than i, or equivalently the probability that bidder / wins the auction, and ß~x(bt) is the inverse of the bid fonction. The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium 9 yields the equilibrium bid function in a first-price, sealed bid auction
Wr where c is the bidder's true cost for carrying out the contract, below which it is not profitable to bid. The second term is a shade, which is a measure of the degree of competition in th e auction. It can be shown that the equilibrium bid fonction is decreasing i n the number of bidders, i.e. there is a competitive effect. 10 Laffont (1997) presents an auction in which the highest bidder wins the auction, but the results are transferable to the case where the lowest bidder is the winner, i.e. the bids are decreasing instead of increasing in the number of bidders. As the true cost for carrying out the contract is revealed in the auction, the winning bidder is the supplier who offers to carry out the contract at th e lowest cost. This means that the first-price, sealed bid auction is efficient. 11 One important aspect of the auctions discussed in t he present paper, is that several contracts can be auctioned in one procurement. However, the bids on each contract are evaluated as i f they were submitted at separate auctions, one for each contract. Every cleaning service contract is unique and the contracting entity evaluates the bids on one contract independently of how the potential suppliers have bid on th e other contracts. The potential suppliers do not necessarily bid for all the contracts auctioned in one procurement. Therefore, the bidding strategies of the bidders for each contract are assumed to be independent of the number of 9 In equilibrium, each bidder submits a bid, given that his/her correct belief that the competitors act according to the same bidding rules as himself/herself is correct Expression (2) contracts auctioned in one procurement and the auctions are modeled as single unit auctions. 12 The bidding strategy is, therefore, in accordance with the equilibrium bid function in the standard first-price, sealed bid auction, given by expression (2).
A guide to the allocation mechanisms
When auctioning cleaning service contracts 13 the contracting entity ca n apply five alternative allocation mechanisms, or procurement procedu res. Four of these mechanisms are first-price, sealed bid auctions or variants of the same, and one is not an auction. The application of mechanisms is related to the volume of the procurement. If it exceeds the so-called threshold value for cleaning services, 200 000 ECU, 14 the contracting entity has a choice between three allocation mechanisms, and two if it is not. Table 1 gives a short description of the allocation mechanisms. Table 1 . Description of the allocation mechanisms.
Allocation mechanism Description THE VOLUME OF THE PROCUREMENT IS BELOW THE THRESHOLD VALUE

Simplified
All potential suppliers are allowed to bid. The contracting entity can invite some or all bidders to a negotiation after the auction. Direct No bidding process. Not an auction.
THE VOLUME OF THE PROCUREMENT EXCEEDS THE THRESHOLD VALUE
Open
All potential suppliers are allowed to bid.
Restricted
Only potential suppliers invited by the contracting entity are allowed to bid. Negotiated As restricted, but the contracting entity can invite some or all bidders to a negotiation after the auction.
For procurements below the threshold value, the simplified o r the direct procedure can be used. The latter is permitted only under very special circumstances, for example, if it is urgent, or if the volume of the procurement is very small. The direct procedure is not an auction as it does not involve a bidding process and is, therefore, not considered in this paper.
Consequently, the simplified procedure is the only alternative f or procurements below the threshold value. Here, all potential suppliers are allowed to submit bids. When the volume of the procurement exceeds the threshold value, the contracting entity has a choice between the open, the restricted or the negotiated procedure. The open procedure is the standard first-price, sealed bid auction, since all potential suppliers are allowed to submit bids.
The restricted and, to some extent, the negotiated procedures are also first-price, sealed bid auctions. However, the degree of competition in the auction can be restricted, as only potential suppliers invited by the contracting entity are allowed to submit bids.
Negotiations with potential suppliers are allowed under the simplified and negotiated procedures. The Public Procurement Act (LOU 1992 (LOU :1528 , states that negotiations are exceptional and only allowed if the terms of the contract are of such a nature that they cannot be specified before the auction. Further, the law also states that the first choice of allocation mechanism in procurements above the threshold value should be the open procedure, followed by the restricted and negotiated procedures . There are other specific circumstances in which the law regulates the use of the negotiated procedure. However, these are legal details and not relevant for the analysis in this study. 15 In the auctions studied in this paper, however, th e use of negotiations under the simplified procedure is nonexistent. In the auctions where the negotiated procedure was used, these have the character of a repeated first-price sealed bid auction. After the bids were submitted and evaluated in the first bidding round, the contracting entity invited some bidders to a second bidding round, in which they could choose to revise their bids or leave them unchanged. If new bid s are submitted, they must be sealed. Consequently, t he simplified procedure is a standard first-price, sealed bid auction whereas t he negotiated procedure is a repeated firstprice sealed bid auction, in which the number of potential bidders can be restricted in both stages. Wang (2000) exhibits a model that allows for renegotiation after a first bidding round.
Here, renegotiations are modeled as costly for the contracting entity but as providing more information about the winning supplier's costs.
The contracting entity's costs in the auction
After the bids are submitted and evaluated, the contracting entity contracts one of the bidders, who is paid in accordance with his/her bid. The expected payment from the contracting entity to the winner is the expected value of his/her bid. That is, the expected value of expression (2), given that t his is the lowest bid among the n submitted bids. Integrating expression (2) over the interval [0,oo) with respect to the density of the lowest true cost, c, which is nf(c) (l-F(c) )"~\ gives the expected payment from the contracting entity to the winner of the contract 16
The expected payment is assumed to be zero if no contract is signed. It is further assumed that the contracting entity accepts bids between zero and infinity, and consequently does not state a reservation cost, i.e. an upper bound on the bid. The equilibrium bid function decreases as the number of bidders increases as is the expected payment to th e winner and th e auction is efficient. 17 Thus, auction theory d oes not support the restricted or negotiated procedure with respect to the possibility of limiting the degree of competition in the auction.
Accordingly, there must be some other reason why the contracting entity uses the option to limit the number of potential bidders. Arguments supporting the use of restricted and negotiated procedures in public procurement within th e EU can be found in Mardas (1999) .
He suggests that the advantages of these procedures over the open procedure are that they encourage prompt delivery, good business relations (which reduces risk); and allow flexibility in the case of a compl ex product when the terms of the contract have to be negotiated with the potential suppliers (which is also stated in the Public Procurement Act (LOU 1992 (LOU :1528 ).
However, th ese arguments are not necessarily valid for the type of contracts studied here.
Further, Mardas points out that a drawback with the restricted and negotiated procedures, is the limited competition. Additional arguments for restricting the number of bidders are found in Hallwood (1996) , who discusses the advantages and disadvantages with a invited bidding Other reasons for limiting the number of potential bidders could be that the contracting entity wants to avoid unserious bids and be forced to contract a "bad" supplier who later has to be replaced before the contract period has expired. To terminate a running contract and auction the same contract again is costly (as is also spending time on unserious bids). These costs are, together with the number of contracts auctioned in the same procurement and other contract characteristics, examples of implementation costs. Therefore, i t is assumed that when the contracting entity decides the allocation mechanism account is taken not only o f the cleaning service market and the expected payment to the winning bidder, but also of the cost of implementation. The same mechanism is applied to all contracts in one procurement. It is also assumed that the contracting entity designs each contract before determining t he allocation mechanism. The procurement can include one or several contracts. In accordance with the law, the number of contracts (NC) is assumed to be exogenous. 18 The contracting entity minimizes the expected total cost of the procurement, that is the sum of the expected payment to the winner of each contract j plus the expected implementation cost
The supplier's true cost for carrying out the contract (c), is observed by neither the contracting entity nor the researcher, and it is not affected by th e choice of allocation mechanism. The option to restrict the number of potential bidders means that the contracting entity's choice of allocation mechanism indirectly affects both the expected payment to the winner of each contract and the implementation cost. The latter is assumed to be dependent on and increasing in the number of potential bidders, n, and dependent on contract specifications, x, characteristics of the municipality, y, and t he number of contracts. The number of potential bidders is, for example, likely to be higher in more densely populated municipalities. The implementation cost is assumed not to affect the bidding strategies of the bidders.
The contracting entity is assumed to invite the same number of bidders for all contracts auctioned in one procurement. This is the rule of the game, but in general the same number of 18 The Public Procurement Act (LOU 1992:1528), forbids the contracting entity to deliberately merge or split the number of contracts in one procurement in order to reach a certain volume.
bids will not be received for all the contracts. For simplicity, I will, however, proceed as if this was the case. A "no bid" could be regarded as a bid equal to + oo. In order to simplify the notation, the cost minimization problem is re-written as
The contracting entity minimizes the expected total cost with respect to the number of potential bidders. The number of bidders who solve this problem, ri, will be a function of contract specifications, characteristics of the municipality, and the number of c ontracts in the auction, ri = ri (x,y,NC) . This generates the following value function (6) (j>ip,x,y,NC) .
If the vector ri is strictly less than the number of potential bidders expected by the contracting entity in each procurement under an unrestricted invitation, ri* the contracting entity chooses the restricted or the negotiated procedure i n order to limit the number of potential bidders. If ri > ri*, the contracting entity uses the simplified or open procurement procedure, i.e. the standard first-price, sealed bid auction. If the two vectors cannot be ranked by a strong preordering, it is not obvious how to proceed. However, as the contracting entity has to invite the same number of bidders on all contracts, it is reasonable to assume that the contracting entity will deal with the complications by picking the allocation mechanism according to the following criterion (7) Minfy (r£,,x,y,NC}t(?r,x,y,NC) where rij^ is the smallest component of the unrestricted vector ri*. In other words, if the first term is smaller than the second, the contracting entity chooses to restrict the auction by inviting rij^ bidders, and if the opposite holds, the unrestricted auction is chosen expecting n~= («r,«r,-, n~c) bidders. Note that if the contracting entity picks n > rij^, this is done against its expectations. At least one contract will have less potential bidders than the number invited by the contracting entity.
The contracting entity could also compare the costs of all the NC restricted procurements that can be constructed from the vector ri* with the unrestricted procurement, i.e. make a choice according to the criterion (8) Minfan(4>(i\', x, y, NC}..., <t>(n"c, x, y, NC) ),tt> (n\x,y,NC)}=Min^,<f>(rr,x,y,NC) .
In other words, the contracting entity chooses to restrict the competition if the least costly competitive restrictive procurement is less than the procurement with free competition, which would be the choice otherwise. Other possibilities are a lso open. Given that the contracting entity uses the ri*^ -strategy it may, sticking to the regulations, invite n > bidders. This is done under the expectation that there will not be more than ri* bidders if n > ri*, and the cost of the competitive restrictive procurement is evaluated accordingly. The contracting entity would, under any circumstances, make a cost minimizing choice between restricting the competition or not in the procurement. This is, in fact, the most important result from this section with respect to the econometric analysis, which focuses on a binary choice between whether to have free competition or not in the procurement.
The Empirical study
The main issue in this paper is the question why the contracting entity uses the opportunity, given in the law, to restrict competition in public procurement. A potential explanation was given in the previous section. This section now presents an empirical analysis of the choice of allocation mechanism.
The part of the total cost that consists of the sum of the expected payment to the winner of each contract is mainly determined by factors outside the control of the contracting entity.
Accordingly, the focus in the empirical analysis is on factors that can affect the total cost through the implementation cost, which the contracting entity can control. Through its choice of mechanism, the contracting entity minimizes the expected total co st. Here, the choice is mimicked by a random utility function, by setting -£
[rc()] = U().
The possible determinants of the probability of observing a particular choice of allocation mechanism are estimated in two separate binary logit regressions. The first logit regression focuses on determinants of the probability that the volume of the procurement is below the threshold value. The second logit regression estimates the probability tha t the contracting entity does not restrict the amount of competition in th e procurement, given that the volume exceeds the threshold value.
The effect of municipal characteristics and contract specifications on the number of bidders for each contract is estimated using a negative binomial regression. This is interesting and important as the number of bidders on each contract affects the payment to the winner of the contract and the implementation cost, and thereby the total cost.
Below the threshold value or not?
If the volume of the procurement, V, is below the threshold value, VT the simplified procedure is applied. Estimation of the probability that the volume o f the procurement is below the threshold value is, therefore, tantamount to estimating the probability of observing a procurement k where the simplified procedure is applied, that is
where ß is the parameter vector. Contract specifications, characteristics of t he municipality, and the number of contracts auctioned in the procurement k are included in the zk vector. The error term is assumed to represent unobserved circumstances that affect t he probability that the procurement is below th e threshold value. This probability is estimated using a binary logit model 
Restrict the competition or not?
Given that the volume of the procurement exceeds the threshold value, the contracting entity has a choice between three different mechanisms, the open, restricted or negotiated procedures. The contracting entity is assumed to make a utility maximizing ch oice among these mechanism, and chooses one mechanism over another if the random utility of that choice exceeds the random utility from all other alternatives. In order to avoid problem with the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (i.i.a.) and since they are so similar, where ß is the difference between the parameter vectors ßQ and . This probability is estimated as
where A is, again, t he logistic cumulative distribution function. The marginal effects a re calculated according to equation (11).
Data
The data set used in this paper consists of 131 procurements, in which Swedish municipalities have auctioned one or several fixed price cleaning service cont racts, during the period 1992 -1998. A request was sent to all Swedish municipalities, 21 asking them for documents regarding their procurement of cleaning services. The response rate was 79.5 percent, i.e. 229 municipalities answered, of which 50 had actually purchased cleaning services during the time period in question. One explanation f or the small number of municipalities actually having auctioned cleaning service contracts might be that public sector cleaning services have only recently been subject to competition in Sweden. In addition, the local council in each municipality, decides whether o r not public procurement of certain goods or services within the municipality should be subject to competition. The data are fairly representative.
Municipalities from the whole of Sweden responded. response rate in percent by county. The data are organized on three levels. Firstly there are the procurements, for which 758 contracts were distributed and finally a total of 5 925 bids for these contracts. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics and frequencies f or procurement and contract level, by allocation mechanism and for the whole sample. The variables that will be used in the regression equations are the number of contracts (one contract for each object), the number of bidders o n each contract and, in each procurement, th e contract and prolongation period, respectively (measured in years), the population density in each municipality (measured a s population divided by area in square kilometers), and the socialist parties' share of the seats in the local council (RED). The open procedure had the largest number of bidders. There were, on average, 8. 
Regression Equations
The probability of observing a procurement below the threshold value and a choice of a non competitive restrictive allocation mechanism are estimated in two separate binary logit models and are assumed to be determined by contract specifications and municipality characteristics. The regression equations are, respectively where AQ is the logistic cumulative distribution function, NC is number of contracts included in one and the same procurement, DENS is the population in the municipality, CP is the contract period, PP is the length of the prolongation period, RED is the socialist par ties'
22 The Mann-Whitney test is a nonparametric test that ranks the observations for different samples and compares the medians from each sample. The null hypothesis is that the number of bidders under two different allocation mechanisms have the same distribution function. The Mann-Whitney test is used instead of, for example, the two share of the seats in the local council, and SAME is a dummy variable reflecting the effect on the choice of allocation mechanism of the contracting entity choosing a particular mechanism in a previous procurement, i.e. the effect of habitual behavior.
SAME-
1 if the observed choice of allocation mechanism is the same as a previous choice in the municipality 0 otherwise
Both regression equations are estimated using maximum likelihood.
The data set used to analyze the factors that could affect the volume of the procurement consists of 131
procurements. Those where the simplified procedure is the observed choice are excluded from the data set. The remaining 71 contracts are used in the estimation of the factors that could affect the probability that the contracting entity chooses not to restrict the competition. In 8 of the procurements the contract period was not specified. These cases are treated as missing observations.
As shown in Section 3, the number of potential bidders, is important for the choice of allocation mechanism. Depending on how it is affected by contract specifications and municipality characteristics, a more o r less restrictive procedure will be the cost minimizing choice for the contracting entity. Empirically the number of bidders differs between contracts auctioned in one procurement. Therefore, it is interesting to study the effect of contract specifications and characteristics of the municipality on the number of bidders for each contract. A negative binomial regression will be estimated to further explore this issue. Here the number of bidders are treated as endogenous and the exogenous variables a re contract specifications and municipality characteristics. As the endogenous variable is count data it would be reasonable t o assume that it is generated by a Poisson distribution. However, such an approach assumes that the variance and mean for the variable are equal. This is not the case. There is evidence of over-dispersion in the variable, see Table 7 , where the z 2 Q) value is a test of over-dispersion. Because of this, th e negative binomial regression model is used 
Results
This section contains a presentation and interpretation of the results from the two binary logit regressions, and the negative binomial regression.
Estimation results, above or below the threshold value?
The results from the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and the partial derivatives for the binary logit model are presented in Table 3 .
The results suggest that the probability that the volume of the procurement is below the threshold value, decreases significantly with the population density in the municipality. This indicates, no t surprisingly, that low value procurements are more common in less densely populated municipalities. The parameter for the number of contracts auctioned in one procurement is significant and negative, whereas the parameter for the number of contracts squared is positive and significant. A s the latter parameter is very small compared with the former, one can conclude that the probability that the volume of the procurement exceeds the threshold value is increasing with the number of contracts included in the same procurement.
However, this relationship is nonlinear. This is reasonable, as descriptive statistics show that a procurement with many small contracts can have a volume below t he threshold value in the same way as a procurement that only includes one big contract (measured as square meters to be cleaned). 24 The prolongation period and contract period parameters are not significant. The restricted log likelihood value, LogL0, is the log likelihood function estimated when all the variables except the constant are omitted from the regression. The likelihood ratio index is 0.23, which indicates that the variables have explanatory power. This i s a goodness of fit measure, and computed according to
The measure is between zero and one. 25 The fact that the model can not be rejected is further underlined by the x 2 statistic from the likelihood ratio test, 26 which is well above the critical value on the 0.5 percent level. The estimated average probability that the simplified procedure is the observed choice, calculated according to expression (10), is 0.47. The estimation results from the binary logit model for procurements above the threshold value are presented in Table 5 . The results show no single significant impact from these parameters on the decision to restrict the competition or not. However, the variables have some explanatory power according to the likelihood ratio index which is 0.14. The % 2 statistic in Table 5 from the likelihood ratio test shows that the model cannot be rejected at a 10 percent significance level. Although it is possible theoretically to motivate the option to restrict the competition in public procurem ent on the basis of an implementation cost, I cannot empirically support this in my study. One explanation of the lack of significant results could be the small number of observations.
Another explanation is that the type of costs discussed in Section 4 are difficult to measure and the variables used here do not reflect these costs correctly.
The estimated average probability that the open procedure is the observed choice is 0.48 and the percentage of correct predictions is 63 percent. The number of correct and actual values are given in Table 6 . The results from the negative binomial regression in which the determinants of the number of bidders for each contract are estimated are presented in Table 7 . The model has explanatory power because the j 2 (15) statistic is well above the critical value.
The z 2 Q) shows that the results from the negative binomial regression are significantly different from the Poisson regression, i.e. there is evidence of over-dispersion. The results show, as one would expect, that there are significantly more bidders competing for contracts in more densely populated municipalities. The political variable affects the number of bidders significantly. The number of bidders are decreasing in proportion to the number of seats in the local council assigned to the socialist parties. The contract categor y has no significant impact on the number of bidders for each contract compared with the reference category, office. 27 The length of the contract has no significant effect on the number of bidders. However, contracts with longer prolongation periods tend to attract more bidders. One possible explanation is that some firms might not find it worthwhile to bid for contra cts that would require investments on their part, in order to be able to carry out the work, if the expected total contract period is only short. These results suggest that the length of the contract and prolongation periods should be set with caution when the contract is designed.
To summarize the findings in the empirical section, the data and the regression results do not support the assumption that an implementation cost actually affects the choice of allocation mechanism. From the regression results, it is possible to conclude that contract specifications and municipality characteristics hav e, together with the number of contracts auctioned in one procurement, an effect on whether the volume of the procurement is below or above th e threshold value. There is also evidence that the number of bidders is dependent on contract specifications and municipality characteristics.
Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to study the choice of allocation mechanism in public procurement in Sweden. The contracting entity, representing the municipality, has a choice between four mechanisms, all of which stipulate sealed bids and that the contract should be awarded to the lowest bidding supplier. The allocation mechanisms are all first-price, sealed bid auctions or variants of the same. Depending on the volume of the procurement, the contracting entity can be selective and restrict the competition and, in one of the mechanisms invite some or all of the bidders to a second bidding round.
There is no support in standard auction theory fo r the possibility of limiting the number of bidders. Since the equilibrium bid function is decreasing in the number of bidders, so is the payment from the contracting entity to the winner. T o find an argument to support this, an implementation cost is introduced for the contracting entity. This cost is added to the expected payment to the winner. The implementation c ost is assumed to be dependent on contract specifications and municipality characteristics.
The possibility that the choice of allocation mechanism is independent of the implementation cost is tested on data on the procurement of cleaning service contracts in Swedish municipalities. This decision is related to the volume of the procurement. Accordingly, the determinants of the probability that the volume of the procurement is below or above a threshold value are estimated using the binary logit model. Where the procurement is below the threshold value, only one mechanism can be applied, the simplified procedure. The results
show that the probability that the volume of the procurement is below the threshold value is decreasing the lower the population density in the municipality and that the number of contracts auctioned in one procurement has a significant impact on this probability. In the case where the volume exceeds the threshold value, th e determinants of the probability that the contracting entity does not restrict the competition in the procurement are estimated using the binary logit model. The results do not show any single significant impact from contract specifications and municipality characteristics on this probability. However, this paper should be se en as a first attempt to formalize and estimate the choice of allocation mechanism in public procurement. It is left for further research to collect more da ta and find more robust results.
A negative binomial regression suggests that the number of bidders does vary significantly between municipalities, and is dependent on the political situation in the local council. The length and value of the contract are important for the determination of the number of bidders.
If the value is too low or the length of t he prolongation period o f the contract period is too short, fewer potential suppliers submit bids. The number of bidders is not dependent on the character of the contract but on the allocation mechanism.
An interesting question for further research is how the choice of allocation mechanism actually affects the payment to the winner. That is, how it affects the winning bid for each cleaning service contract. Since the length of the prolongation period seems to be an important factor for the degree of competition in the auction, it would also be interesting to analyze how long the total contract period should be in order to attract as many bidders as possible, but without being too long and thereby eliminating some or all competition for future procurements.
